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THE NEED TO REFOCUS THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT’S POST-9/11 COUNTER-
TERRORIST FINANCING STRATEGY 
DIRECTED AT AL QAEDA TO TARGET THE 
FUNDING OF ISIS 
Jimmy Gurulé* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) is the most deadly and 
well-funded foreign terrorist organization in the world.  There are 
estimates that ISIS has an annual budget of over $2 billion to finance its 
goal of establishing a caliphate, or Islamic state, governed by its twisted 
version of Islamic law.1  Flush with funds, the terror group has acquired 
and controls large swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq, and the threat it 
poses extends to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Lebanon, 
and beyond.2  While depriving ISIS of funding is a central component of 
the United States government’s strategy to degrade and destroy ISIS, these 
efforts have been ineffective.3  ISIS is largely self-financed, and its sources 
of funding are different from those of al Qaeda.4  As a result, the 
government needs to reevaluate and refocus its post-9/11 counter-
terrorist financing strategy directed at al Qaeda to effectively disrupt and 
deprive ISIS of funding. 
                                                 
*  Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.  The author served as Under Secretary for 
Enforcement, United States Department of the Treasury, from 2001 to 2003. This Article was 
originally delivered in part as testimony at a hearing entitled Terrorist Financing and the 
Islamic State before the House Financial Services Committee, 113th Congress (Nov. 13, 2014), 
and in part as introductory remarks at the Valparaiso University Law Review Symposium: 
National Security Up Close and Personal (Nov. 14, 2014). 
1 See Al-Araby al-Jadeed, Islamic State Group Sets Out First Budget, Worth $2bn, AL-ARABY 
(Jan. 4, 2015), http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2015/1/4/islamic-state-group-
sets-out-first-budget-worth-2bn [http://perma.cc/WV3W-4Z98] (discussing that Sheikh 
Abu Saad al-Ansari, one of the Islamic State’s senior religious leaders, disclosed the budget 
for ISIS). 
2 Terrorism in Africa:  The Imminent Threat to the United States:  Hearing Before Subcomm. on 
Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 114th Cong. 3, 7 (2015) 
(statement of Daniel L. Byman, Research Director, Center for Middle East Policy) [hereinafter 
Byman]. 
3 Terrorist Financing and the Islamic State:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 113th 
Cong. 7, 8 (2014) (statement of David Cohen, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence, U.S. Treasury Department) [hereinafter Cohen testimony]. 
4 See id. at 64 (distinguishing the Islamic State from other terrorist groups because it 
derives most of its finances from terrorist activities in Syria and Iraq). 
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II. THE DANGER AND THREAT POSED BY ISIS
ISIS emerged in the “global consciousness in June [2014] when its 
fighters seized Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, after moving into Iraq 
from [its original] base in Syria.”5  The terrorist group is attempting to 
redraw the map of the Middle East and establish an Islamic caliphate led 
by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-appointed caliph.6  In territories 
throughout both Iraq and Syria, ISIS has been swiftly expanding its 
control by seizing towns along supply routes, critical infrastructure, and 
border crossings.7  Most recently, ISIS fighters have seized control of 
Ramadi, the capital of Iraq’s Anbar province, and the historic city of 
Palmyra in central Syria.8  The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that 
ISIS has between 20,000 and 31,500 fighters in Iraq and Syria, and 
approximately 15,000 of the jihadists are foreign recruits.9  ISIS has also 
gained support from a number of important jihadist groups, including 
Boko Haram in Nigeria and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in Egypt.10  Both 
terrorist groups have pledged allegiance to ISIS and are now considered 
official affiliates of ISIS.11  Former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated 
that “[ISIS] is as sophisticated and well-funded as any group that we have 
5 Ben Hubbard & Eric Schmitt, Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel Success of ISIS, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1tEDcVI [http://perma.cc/65BQ-L2PT]. 
6 See Tim Arango & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Actions in Iraq Fueled Rise of a Rebel, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 10, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1vvUBTx [http://perma.cc/7WZ7-U4B4] (discussing Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi’s mission to remove religious minorities such as Shiites and Yazidis to 
establish a caliphate). 
7 See Gregor Aisch et al., How ISIS Works, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2014), 
http://nyti.ms/1qa7gTm [http://perma.cc/FKZ5-L36U] (observing that recently, ISIS has 
advanced deeper into Syria and overthrowing cities’ and towns’ resources). 
8 See Tim Arango, Key Iraqi City Falls to ISIS as Last of Security Forces Flee, N.Y. TIMES (May 
17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/18/world/middleeast/isis-ramadi-iraq.html 
[http://perma.cc/RUQ9-7GSK] (explaining that upon seizure of Ramadi, ISIS ransacked 
military headquarters seizing stores of weapons and killing citizens loyal to the 
government); Anne Barnard & Hwaida Saad, ISIS Fighters Seize Control of Syrian City of 
Palmyra, and Ancient Ruins, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/ 
21/world/middleeast/syria-isis-fighters-enter-ancient-city-of-palmyra.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/4UAL-UCGU] (reporting that ISIS overthrew the city of Palmyra). 
9 Current Terrorist Threat to the United States:  Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on 
Intelligence, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director, National 
Counterterrorism Center). 
10 See Byman, supra note 2, at 6–7 (providing that the Islamic State has other affiliates 
located in Libya, Yemen, and the Arabian Peninsula). 
11 See id. (noting ISIS, as of March 2015, has seven official affiliates or “provinces”). 
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seen.12  They’re beyond just a terrorist group.13  They marry ideology, a 
sophistication of strategic and tactical military prowess.14  They are 
tremendously well-funded.”15 
The acts of brutality committed by ISIS include the beheadings of two 
American journalists; the torture and ruthless slaughter of civilians; the 
persecution of minorities; and gross violations of human rights that 
constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.16  ISIS uses 
“mass executions, public beheadings, rape, and symbolic crucifixion 
displays to terrorize the population into submission and ‘purify’ the 
community . . . .”17  On June 10, 2014, members of the extremist group 
“systematically executed some 600 male inmates from a prison outside the 
northern Iraqi city of Mosul.”18  On October 31, 2014, the United Nations 
Security Council condemned ISIS’s kidnapping and murder of “scores” of 
Sunni tribesmen in the Anbar province.19  Media reports of this incident 
suggest that more than 300 bodies were found in mass graves.20  After 
                                                 
12 Chuck Hagel, U.S. Sec’y of State & Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
U.S. Dep’t of Def., Press Briefing in the Pentagon Briefing Room, 4 (Aug. 21, 2014), 
http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Article/606917 [http://perma.cc/ 
2PWT-LHK9]. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Press Release, Dep’t of Defense, Dep’t of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Hagel and 
General Dempsey in the Pentagon Briefing Room (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.defense.gov/ 
News/News-Transcripts/Article/606917 [http://perma.cc/2PWT-LHK9]. 
16 See Joshua Berlinger, New York Times:  ISIS Hostages Were Tortured before Beheadings, 
CNN (Oct. 26, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/26/world/meast/isis-beheading-
torture/ [http://perma.cc/3UAX-PKZS] (stating that an American journalist was the first 
western civilian executed by ISIS on camera, as well as another American journalist, a British 
aid worker, and British taxi driver); William Saletan, The ISIS Atrocities We Can’t Forget, SLATE 
(Sept. 3, 2014, 7:37 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/ 
2014/09/don_t_watch_isis_s_murder_of_steven_sotloff_honor_him_by_remembering_the.
html [http://perma.cc/Y2QF-KKZ6]. 
17 Byman, supra note 2, at 6. 
18 Iraq:  ISIS Executed Hundreds of Prison Inmates, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 30, 2014), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/30/iraq-isis-executed-hundreds-prison-inmates 
[http://perma.cc/C9B5-FHHH]. 
19 See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Iraq, U.N. 
Press Release SC/11625-IK/694 (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ 
sc11625.doc.htm [http://perma.cc/XZX8-4G46] (noting that these tribesmen, with the Iraq 
government, have been combating terrorism).  But see Security Council Condemns ISIL's 
Murder of Sunni Tribesman in Anbar, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.un.org/ 
apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49227#.VF4dlPnF98H [http://perma.cc/3GWG-95X8] 
(urging the world to unite in a “common effort” to stop Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s 
(“ISIL”) rampant violence). 
20 See Raheem Salman, Bodies of Hundreds of Iraqi Tribesmen Fighting Against ISIS Found in 
Mass Grave, HUFF. POST (Oct. 31, 2014, 3:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/ 
10/30/iraq-mass-grave_n_6074612.html [http://perma.cc/77Y6-8TLA] (reporting that the 
mass graves contained Sunni Muslim men between the ages of eighteen and fifty-five). 
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seizing Badoush Prison, the gunmen from ISIS separated the Sunni and 
Shia inmates and then forced the Shia men to kneel along the edge of a 
ravine before executing them with assault rifles and automatic weapons.21  
The day after the Mosul massacre, ISIS carried out the mass killing of Shia 
soldiers in the city of Takrit.22  In this event, ISIS claimed to have executed 
1700 Shia troops and uploaded videos on the Internet showing their 
gunmen slaying the captives.23  Further, the sectarianism ISIS foments is 
worsening Shi’a-Sunni tension and poses a grave threat to Middle East 
stability.24 
While ISIS threatens regional security in the Middle East, the terror 
group also poses a serious threat to United States national security 
interests.25  According to a recent United Nations Security Council report, 
foreign recruits fighting in Iraq and Syria originate from more than eighty 
countries, including the United States.26  The risk of future terrorist attacks 
may increase when the foreign fighters return home.27  These battle-
hardened and militarily-trained jihadists may be deliberately tasked by 
terror cells to commit terrorist attacks on the homeland.28 
Finally, ISIS’s ability to use social media to influence “lone wolf” 
terrorist attacks should not be underestimated.29  On October 22, 2014, a 
terrorist attack in Ottawa, Canada, resulted in the death of a Canadian 
soldier.30  The terrorist proceeded to attack the Centre Block parliament 
21 Id. 
22 See id. (detailing that in this massacre, the Human Rights Watch estimated 560 to 770 
captives were killed). 
23 Id. 
24 See Byman, supra note 2, at 7 (explaining how ISIS disrupts the stability in the Middle 
East more than Al Qaeda ever has). 
25 See Rep. of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team (2014) submitted 
pursuant to resolution 2161 (2014), transmitted by Letter Dated 29 October 2014 from the 
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team in accordance with paragraph (a) of 
annex I to Sec. Council resolution 2083 (2012) addressed to the Chair of the Sec. Council 
Comm. pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and 
associated individuals and entities, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. S/2014/770 (Oct. 27, 2014), 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF9 
6FF9%7D/s_2014_770.pdf. 
26 Id. at ¶¶ 14, 31. 
27 See id. at ¶ 35 (warning that traumatized and “no background” returnees pose a threat 
to society as they are more likely to commit terrorist acts). 
28 See id. at ¶¶ 35–36 (revealing attacks that were carried out by individuals tasked by 
terror cells such as:  an attack in January 2013, by thirty-two terrorist fighters in Algeria; the 
2012 shooting by Mohammed Merah in France, killing French Army personnel and Jewish 
citizens, and the 2014 Belgian murders of four Jewish individuals). 
29 Byman, supra note 2, at 7. 
30 Jon Williams et al., Canada PM Calls Parliament Shooting a “Terrorist” Act, ABC NEWS 
(Aug. 23, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/International/canada-pm-calls-parliament-
shooting-terrorist-act/story?id=26372013 [http://perma.cc/VEK3-KAU7]. 
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building, where members of the Canadian Parliament were present.31  The 
Prime Minister of Canada characterized the incident as a terrorist attack.32  
Recently, the New York City Police Commissioner called a hatchet attack 
in the subway, which left two New York Police Department Officers 
injured, a terrorist attack.33  Such “lone wolf” attacks are not limited to 
North America.34  A French magazine, Charlie Hebdo, was attacked in Paris 
on January 7, 2015, in a deadly shooting claimed by a branch of al Qaeda.35  
The next day, a small kosher grocery store in Paris was attacked, resulting 
in the death of four innocent civilians.36  The gunman in the grocery store 
terrorist incident claimed to be a member of ISIS.37  In Copenhagen, on 
February 15, 2015, a gunman opened fire at a cultural center holding a free 
speech debate, killing two victims.38  He had sworn allegiance to ISIS on 
his Facebook page before the shooting.39  Both the incident in Paris and 
                                                 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Laila Kearney, NYC Police Say Hatchet Attack by Islam Convert Was Terrorism, REUTERS 
(Oct. 24, 2014, 6:22 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/24/us-usa-newyork-
hatchet-idUSKCN0IC2RG20141024 [http://perma.cc/V3PQ-KQZ6]. 
34 See Michael S. Schmidt & Eric Schmitt, Potential Holiday Threats Assessed With Focus on 
‘Lone Wolf’ Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/ 
us/lone-wolf-terrorists-seen-as-big-threat-authorities-say.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/ 
L28D-E33W] (revealing that the U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter recognizes that 
Europe and other places in the world are vulnerable to these “lone wolf” attacks). 
35 See Yemen Al Qaeda Leader Who Claimed Credit for Charlie Hebdo Attack Killed in U.S. Drone 
Strike, NBC NEWSWORLD (May 7, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/al-qaeda-
arabian-peninsula-leader-nasr-al-ansi-killed-u-n355631[http://perma.cc/FN7F-3CNX] 
(highlighting that Nasr bin Ali al-Ansi, an Al Qaeda Leader claimed responsibility through 
a video online for the Charlie Hebdo deaths); James Gordon Meek, Al Qaeda Gave Charlie 
Hebdo Killers $20k, ABC NEWS (Jan 14, 2015, 7:40 AM ET), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
International/al-qaeda-laid-plan-charlie-hebdo-massacre-video/story?id=28213640 
[http://perma.cc/GAT6-MQZ6]; see also Catherine E. Shoichet, Al Qaeda Branch Claims 
Charlie Hebdo Attack Was Years in the Making, CNN (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2015/01/14/europe/charlie-hebdo-france-attacks [http://perma.cc/X5AR-KVE2] 
(identifying the Al Qaeda affiliate as Yemen’s Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula “AQAP” 
who gave one of the Charlie Hebdo shooters, identified as brothers Cherif Kouachi and Said 
Kouachi, $20,000 for terrorist operations three years ago). 
36 Catherine E. Shoichet & Josh Levs, Al Qaeda Branch Claims Charlie Hebdo Attack Was Years 
in the Making, CNN (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/14/europe/charlie-
hebdo-france-attacks/ [https://perma.cc/QTC4-BE6M]. 
37 See id. (providing that police found two ISIS flags in the gunman’s apartment and he 
told authorities that he belonged to ISIS). 
38 Ralph Ellis et al., Denmark Terror Suspect Swore Fidelity to ISIS Leader on Facebook Page, 
CNN (Feb. 23, 2015, 12:23 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/16/europe/denmark-
shootings/ [http://perma.cc/9FSV-KM48]. 
39 Id. 
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Copenhagen were labeled as terrorist attacks, by the President of France 
and the Prime Minister of Denmark respectively.40 
III.  THE PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF FUNDING FOR ISIS 
ISIS has fundamentally different methods of obtaining funding than 
al Qaeda and other foreign terrorist organizations.  Al Qaeda and affiliated 
terrorist groups receive the vast majority of their funding from external 
sources, such as corrupt charities, deep-pocket donors, state sponsors of 
terrorism, and other terrorist sympathizers.  For example, Al Rashid Trust, 
WAFA Humanitarian Organization, Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, 
various branches of Al Haramain Foundation, Global Relief Foundation, 
and Benevolence International Foundation are charities accused of raising 
money for al Qaeda. 
According to the Department of State, Hezbollah receives substantial 
sums of funding, training, weapons, explosives, and logistical support 
from Iran and Syria.  The organization’s annual operating budget is 
estimated between $200 and $500 million, including approximately $100 
million from Iran.  In light of its support from Iran, Hezbollah does not 
rely on charities to raise funds as much as other terrorist groups, such as 
al Qaeda and Hamas.  Hezbollah also depends on a wide variety of 
criminal activities, including fraud and the drug trade, to raise money to 
support its terrorist efforts, while some funds come from charitable 
donations. 
Hamas’ annual budget is disputed due to its control over Gaza.  The 
Council on Foreign Relations lists Hamas’s annual budget as $70 million.41  
However, in 2010 Hamas stated that its budget was $540 million, the vast 
majority of which comes from “undisclosed” foreign aid, such as Iran and 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.42 
                                                 
40 Dean Schabner, Copenhagen Synagogue Shooting Victim Dies; City on Edge After Two 
Attacks, ABC NEWS (Feb 14, 2015, 9:21 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/International/ 
copenhagen-synagogue-shooting-victim-dies-city-edge-attacks/story?id=28968413 
[http://perma.cc/7WNK-6UC2]; Matthew Weaver et al., Charlie Hebdo:  Officials Establish 
Link Between Gunmen in Both Attacks—As it Happened, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2015 9:52 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/jan/09/charlie-hebdo-manhunt-kouachi 
-terrorist-links-live-updates#block-54b022e6e4b01f977f44914f [http://perma.cc/BR8G-
BKVK]. 
41  Zachary Laub, Hamas, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Aug. 1, 2014), 
www.cfr.org/israel/hamas/p8968 [http://perma.cc/TQH9-9KDV]. 
42 Nidal Al-Mughrabi, Foreign Fund for Hamas Hit by Syria Unrest-Diplomats, REUTERS 
(Aug. 21, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/21/uk-palestinians-hamas-
finance-idUSTRE77K19120110821 [https://perma.cc/T4RG-88RU]. 
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Further, the CIA estimates that Taliban leaders and their allies receive 
$106 million a year from donors outside Afghanistan.43  According to 
Stanley A. McChrystal, former Commander of United States and NATO 
forces in Afghanistan, other sources of funding come from imposing a tax 
on local Afghans, ransom payments, and the opium drug trade.44 
ISIS is the most well-funded terrorist organization in history.  
However, in contrast to other terrorist groups that rely on external sources 
of funding, ISIS is primarily self-funded.  ISIS has four major sources of 
financing.  First, ISIS receives substantial funding from the illicit sale of oil 
from oil fields and refineries under its controls in Iraq and Syria.  The 
proceeds from the sale of ISIS oil are estimated between $1 million to $2 
million a day.45  The oil fields controlled by ISIS produce approximately 
20,000 to 30,000 barrels daily.46 
Second, extortion and illicit taxation systems are also a significant 
source of income for ISIS.47  Extortion payments bring in “several million 
dollars a month” for ISIS.48  Third, ISIS profits from looting ancient 
artifacts in Iraq and Syria.  The income received from the theft of 
antiquities is second only to the revenue the terrorist group derives from 
illicit oil sales.49  The scale of ISIS’s looting and profits from trafficking in 
                                                 
43 Craig Whitlock, Afghan Insurgents’ Diverse Funding Sources Pose Challenges, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 27, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/26/ 
AR2009092602707.html [https://perma.cc/5DDL-632F]. 
44 Memorandum from U.S. Army General Stanley A. McChrysta to Sec’y of Def. Robert 
M. Gates, COMISAF’s Initial Assessment (Aug. 30, 2009), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/ 
NSAEBB/NSAEBB292/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf [https://perma.cc/VB8C-
ADA2]. 
45 Aisch et al., supra note 7.  These funding figures were reported at the end of 2014.  
However, the amount of money ISIS receives from the sale of oil on the black market has 
been reduced as a result of military strikes and resultant damage on ISIS-controlled oil 
refineries.   
46 Keith Johnson & Jamila Trindle, Treasury’s War on the Islamic State, FOREIGN POLICY (Oct. 
23, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/23/treasurys-war-on-the-islamic-state/ 
[https://perma.cc/5BNL-4XMX]. 
47 Charles Lister, Cutting off ISIS’ Cash Flow, BROOKINGS (Oct. 24, 2014, 10:30 AM), 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2014/10/24-lister-cutting-off-isis-jabhat 
-al-nusra-cash-flow [http://perma.cc/7TW5-E3QU]. 
48 Johnson & Trindle, supra note 46. 
49 Justine Drennan, The Black-Market Battleground, FOREIGN POLICY (Oct. 17, 2014), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/10/17/the_black_market_battleground_syr
ia_iraq_isis [http://perma.cc/F7S8-YP9X]; see also Loveday Morris, Islamic State Isn’t Just 
Destroying Ancient Artifacts—It’s Selling Them, WASH. POST (June 8, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/islamic-state-isnt-just-destroying-
ancient-artifacts--its-selling-them/2015/06/08/ca5ea964-08a2-11e5-951e-8e15090d64ae_ 
story.html [http://perma.cc/B6LC-5XYZ] (“Iraqi officials say it is the group’s second most 
important commercial activity after oil sales, earning the militants tens of millions of 
dollars.”). 
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antiquities is unprecedented.50  Moreover, tracking and recovering the 
stolen artifacts poses a difficult challenge for law enforcement.  According 
to one expert, “The material is gradually, incrementally laundered in the 
world-antiquities market, and it becomes very difficult to establish when, 
where, who, what, why, at that point in time.”51  The looting of the cultural 
artifacts of Iraq carried out by ISIS has drawn strong condemnation by the 
United Nations General Assembly.52  Finally, kidnappings for ransom 
constitute another major source of ISIS funding.53  Ransom payments have 
netted ISIS approximately $20 million this year alone. 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS TO DISRUPT ISIS FUNDING STREAMS AND RESTRICT 
ISIS’S ACCESS TO THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
A. Targeting for Designation under Executive Order 13224 Individuals and 
Entities That Enable ISIS to Sell Oil on the Black Market 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. 
government developed a strategy to dismantle the financial network of al 
Qaeda and affiliated terrorist organizations, and disrupt the flow of funds 
to foreign terrorists.  The centerpiece of the government’s counter-terrorist 
financing strategy is to freeze the assets of suspected terrorists, terrorist-
related entities, deep-pocket donors, and other financial supporters of 
terrorism, and prohibit such individuals and entities from doing business 
in the United States.  The strategy is preemptive in nature, intending to 
prevent the financing of terrorist attacks and killing of innocent civilians. 
The authority to block terrorist funds derives from Executive Order 
(“E.O.”) 13224 issued by President George W. Bush on September 23, 
2001.54  President Bush invoked this authority under the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”).55  The IEEPA authorizes the 
                                                 
50 Drennan, supra note 49. 
51 Id. (quoting Michael Danti, a prominent archaeologist leading a U.S. funded effort to 
document this destruction). 
52 See Meetings Coverage, General Assembly, Expressing Outrage Over Attacks on 
Cultural Heritage of Iraq, General Assembly Unanimously Adopts Resolution Calling for 
Urgent Action, U.N. GA/11646 (May 28, 2015), http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ 
ga11646.doc.htm [http://perma.cc/5EQL-STLQ] (condemning ISIL’s pillaging and looting 
of Iraq). 
53 See Johnson & Trindle, supra note 46 (stating how the Islamic State has made millions 
from ransoms). 
54 Exec. Order No. 13224, 3 C.F.R. 786–90 (2001), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 
(1977) note (Supp. IV 2004), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/ 
Documents/13224.pdf [http://perma.cc/P6CT-PAT3] [hereinafter E.O. 13224]. 
55 Congress enacted IEEPA in 1977, which was amended by the USA Patriot Act in 2001.  
See International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. II, 91 Stat. 1626 
(1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–07 (2012)) [hereinafter IEEPA]; Uniting and 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 2 [2016], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol50/iss2/4
2016] Counter-Terrorist Financing Strategy 501 
President to declare a national emergency “to deal with any unusual and 
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part 
outside of the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or 
economy of the United States.”56  After declaring a national emergency, 
the IEEPA grants the President broad economic powers, including the 
authority to block the transfer of any property in which “any foreign 
country or national thereof has any interest. . . .”57  Simply stated, “once 
the President has declared a national emergency, the IEEPA authorizes the 
blocking of property to protect against the threat.”58 
President Bush determined that the grave acts of terrorism committed 
by foreign terrorists, including the terrorist attacks in New York, 
Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001, and the 
continuing threat of terrorist attacks against U.S. nationals constituted “an 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, 
and economy of the United States.”59  E.O. 13224 provides that “because 
of the pervasiveness and expansiveness of the financial foundations of 
foreign terrorists, financial sanctions may be appropriate for these foreign 
persons that support or otherwise associate with these foreign 
terrorists.”60 
Under E.O. 13224, President Bush invoked the IEEPA to initially 
designate twelve individuals and fifteen entities and freeze their assets in 
the United States.  These twenty-seven individuals and groups are labeled 
“Specially Designated Global Terrorists” (“SDGTs”) and identified in the 
Annex to the Order.  The designations included “core members of al 
Qaeda, affiliated terrorist groups, Islamic charities suspected of funding 
al Qaeda, and other businesses believed to be a front for al Qaeda.”  With 
respect to the twenty-seven SDGTs, the legal implications are two-fold.  
First, the property and interests in property in the United States of these 
persons and entities are ordered to be blocked.61  Second, U.S. persons are 
                                                 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001 (codified in scattered sections of 5 app., 8, 12, 15, 
18, 18 app., 21, 22, 28, 31, 42, 47, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).  JIMMY GURULÉ, UNFUNDING TERROR:  THE 
LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE FINANCING OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 367 n.245 (2008); S.C. Res. 1373, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001), http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/specialmeetings/2012/ 
docs/United%20Nations%20Security%20Council%20Resolution%201373%20(2001).pdf 
[http://perma.cc/C3EL-3XGU]. 
56 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012). 
57 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
58 Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
59 E.O. 13224, supra note 54. 
60 Id. 
61 Id.; See E.O. 13224, supra note 54, at § 1(a)–(d); see also 31 C.F.R. § 594.201(a) (2004). 
Gurulé: The Need to Refocus the U.S. Government's Post-9/11 Counter-Terro
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016
502 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
prohibited from engaging in any transactions with such persons and 
entities.62 
E.O. 13224 is broad in scope.  The Order authorizes blocking the 
property or property interests of foreign persons and entities that are (1) 
“owned or controlled by,” or “act for or on behalf of,” (2) “assist in, 
sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for,” or 
(3) “otherwise associated” with foreign terrorists.63  Finally, E.O. 13224 
authorizes the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the Attorney General, to designate persons determined “to 
have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of 
terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals, or the national 
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.”64 
The initial list of twenty-seven SDGTs has grown to over 800 
individuals and entities covered by the Order.65  Generally, the list of 
SDGTs consists of suspected terrorists, terrorist sympathizers, charities 
and other front entities, and persons believed to provide funding and 
other assistance to al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups. 
Perhaps because of the fundamentally different ways in which al 
Qaeda and ISIS raise funds, since May 2014, only four ISIS members have 
been designated SDGTs by the Treasury Department.66  Of those four, only 
two were involved in financing ISIS.  One facilitated the movement of 
funds from Kuwait to Syria, and one raised money from external donors.  
However, neither was involved in the terrorist organization’s major 
sources of funding.  Thus, it appears that the Treasury Department has not 
                                                 
62 See E.O. 13224, supra note 54, at § 2(a) (stating how U.S. citizens are prohibited from 
having transactions with those in the Islamic State). 
63 Id. § 1(c), (d)(i)–(ii). 
64 Id. § 1(b). 
65 See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. TREASURY, TERRORISTS ASSET REPORT TO 
THE CONGRESS ON ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO TERRORIST COUNTRIES AND 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM PROGRAM DESIGNEES, 5–6 (2013), http://www.treasury.gov/ 
resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Documents/tar2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/5W9F-
MS95] (stating that on December 31, 2014, a total of 893 individuals and entities had been 
designated SDGTs under E.O. 13224, which includes sixty Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
designated by the Secretary of State pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996). 
66 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Designates Al-Qa’ida Leaders in Syria 
(May 14, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2396.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/CL3W-T8YH] [hereinafter Al-Qa’ida Leaders Press Release] (designating 
Abd Al-Rahman Mustafa Al-Qaduli “for acting for on behalf of ISIL,” and also designating 
a member of al Qaeda); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Designates Three Key 
Supporters in Syria and Iraq (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/jl2605.aspx [http://perma.cc/DW5H-TYSL] [hereinafter Three Supporters 
Press Release] (designating two individuals associated with the Syria-based, al Qaeda-linked 
terrorist organization Al Nusrah Front, and Abd al-Rahman Khalaf ‘Ubayd Juday’ al-‘Anizi, 
a financial facilitator for ISIL). 
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gained its footing in identifying and designating individuals involved in 
the principle methods of funding for ISIS. 
ISIS-related designations by the Treasury Department raise two 
primary concerns.  First, few individuals associated with ISIS have been 
designated for asset freeze under E.O. 13224.67  The dearth of ISIS-related 
designations is deeply disturbing.  Second, none of the Treasury 
designations include individuals engaged in any of the major sources of 
funding for ISIS.  While E.O. 13224 authorizes designating individuals 
merely “associated with” foreign terrorists, the Treasury Department 
should refocus its efforts and prioritize its resources on targeting 
individuals that are enabling ISIS to sell oil on the black market.  The illicit 
oil trade is generating hundreds of millions of dollars annually for ISIS.  
The Treasury Department should target those individuals and entities 
selling and purchasing oil from ISIS and designate them under E.O. 13224 
for being “otherwise associated” with a foreign terrorist.  Once 
designated, United States persons are prohibited from doing business 
with such individuals and entities, and their assets located in the United 
States should be blocked.68  The Treasury Department should also focus 
its designations on entities that are providing material, parts, and 
technological support to maintain the oil refineries controlled by ISIS.  
Finally, financial institutions that are knowingly receiving and 
transferring funds from the sale of ISIS oil should be designated under 
E.O. 13224, and these entities should be prohibited from doing business in 
the United States.  If ISIS is generating $1 to $2 million a day from the illicit 
sale of oil, it is difficult to imagine that banks are not being used to receive 
and transfer large sums of money to entities controlled by ISIS.  
To maximize the effectiveness of ISIS-related designations, the 
Treasury Department should prioritize targeting individuals and entities 
that are involved in the sale of oil for ISIS.  More specifically, the Treasury 
Department should target for designation the middlemen and persons 
                                                 
67 See Al-Qa’ida Leaders Press Release, supra note 66 (designating Abd Al-Rahman 
Mustafa Al-Qaduli “[as] acting for on behalf of ISIL”).  The State Department designated a 
few members of ISIS, but none of these individuals are involved in providing financial 
assistance to ISIS.  Id.; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Terrorist Designation of Abu 
Mohammed al-Adnani (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/ 
230676.html [http://perma.cc/E5S9-YR9D]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Designation 
of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/ 
09/232067.htm [http://perma.cc/C8DB-S27C]; see, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
Terrorist Designation of Denis Cuspert (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.state.gov/r/ 
pa/prs/2015/02/237324.htm [http://perma.cc/PJY4-4NPB]. 
68 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN) 
(Sep. 10, 2015), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/ 
default.aspx [http://perma.cc/7T9E-R6AG] (stating the general steps taken against those 
whom the U.S. Treasury Department deems as terrorists). 
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transporting the oil, as well as the border guards and Turkish officials 
looking the other way as oil is smuggled into Turkey.  The Treasury 
Department should also target any foreign businesses involved in the 
illicit oil trade, including companies that purchase the oil. 
According to Treasury Department sources, ISIS has collected tens of 
millions in ransom payments so far this year.  Banks are likely involved in 
the transfer of funds from the collection of large hostage-ransom 
payments.  Any foreign bank with a United States branch that knowingly 
transfers funds for ISIS or ISIS-controlled entities should be subject to 
severe economic sanctions. 
Treasury Department designations should also focus on persons 
suspected of trading in stolen Iraqi and Syrian artifacts.  These individuals 
could have assets in the United States that would be subject to blocking 
under E.O. 13224.  Such individuals could also be engaged in business 
activities in the United States.  If so, U.S. persons would be prohibited 
from doing business with such individuals.  Ultimately, designating 
individuals and entities involved in the major sources of funding for ISIS 
should be a top priority. 
The purpose of designating individuals under E.O. 13224 is not 
merely to place their names on a “name and shame” list.  The designations 
are intended to freeze the assets of individuals providing funding and 
other financial assistance to foreign terrorist organizations, and prohibit 
such persons from doing business in the United States.  It is not the 
number of SDGT designations that matters most, but the quality of the 
designations.  The relevant standard for determining who should be 
designated under E.O. 13224 should be whether the designations will 
disrupt ISIS’s ability to raise funds and finance their terrorist activities.  To 
be effective, the SDGT designations should focus on the principal sources 
of ISIS funding.  Focusing designations on members of ISIS that are not 
involved in the internal funding of ISIS will have limited impact in 
disrupting ISIS’s ability to raise funds and finance deadly terrorist attacks. 
B. Increase the Number of Terrorist Financing Prosecutions 
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has a mixed record of prosecuting 
terrorist financing cases.  Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 
there have been very few major terrorist financing prosecutions.  The DOJ 
should make it a top priority to investigate and criminally prosecute 
individuals and entities involved in the major sources of funding for ISIS. 
Individuals and companies that purchase oil from ISIS, as well as entities 
that provide technological services to maintain ISIS oil refineries, as well 
as financial institutions that knowingly engage in transferring funds 
generated from the illicit oil trade, are providing material support to a 
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foreign terrorist organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.  Such 
individuals and entities are enabling ISIS to raise hundreds of millions of 
dollars to finance terrorist activities and should be prosecuted and 
punished to the full extent of the law.  Individuals involved in other major 
sources of ISIS funding should also be held criminally accountable. To 
increase the number of terrorist financing prosecutions, the Treasury 
Department should enhance their efforts in collecting financial 
intelligence information and sharing such information with the DOJ. 
Congress has enacted important legislation aimed at cutting off 
financial assistance and services to foreign terrorist organizations.  The 
“material support” statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B, enable federal 
prosecutors to prosecute persons that provide “material support or 
resources,” including money, financial services, transportation, and other 
forms of assistance, to foreign terrorists and foreign terrorist 
organizations.69  Congress recognized that “[c]utting off ‘material support 
or resources’ from terrorist organizations deprives them of the means with 
which to carry out acts of terrorism and potentially leads to their 
demise.”70 
Section 2339A makes it a crime to provide “material support or 
resources” “knowing or intending” that they are to be used to prepare for 
or carry out terrorist-related crimes, such as terrorist bombings and 
extrajudicial killings.71  By contrast, § 2339B punishes whoever knowingly 
provides “material support or resources” to a “foreign terrorist 
organization” (“FTO”) with knowledge that the organization has been 
designated a FTO by the Secretary of State, or has engaged in or engages 
in terrorist activities.72  Upon conviction, both §§ 2339A and 2339B 
                                                 
69 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2012) (defining “material support or resources” as:  “any 
property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or 
financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, 
safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, 
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or 
include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials)”). 
70 Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 932 (9th Cir. 2009). 
71 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2012). 
72 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012).  Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) states that: 
[A] person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated 
terrorist organization (as defined in subsection (g)(6)), that the 
organization has engaged in or engages in terrorist activity (as defined 
in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or that 
the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in 
section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1988 and 1989). 
Id. 
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authorize a term of imprisonment of not more than fifteen years, and, if 
death of any person results, imprisonment of any term of years or for life.73 
Section 2339A requires proof that the defendant acted with a 
heightened state of mind or mens rea not required under § 2339B.74  To 
convict for a violation of § 2339A, the Government must prove that the 
defendant provided material support or resources “knowing or 
intending” that they are to be used to carry out a terrorism-related crime.75  
To prove a violation of § 2339B, the defendant must have knowledge that 
the organization is a designated FTO or has engaged or engages in acts of 
terrorism.76 
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court held that in 
order to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, the Government is 
not required to prove that the defendant intended to further the terrorist 
activities of the FTO by the provision of material support or resources.77  
Under § 2339B, the defendant is criminally liable even if he intended to 
provide money or other forms of assistance for a humanitarian purpose or 
purpose totally unrelated to the group’s terrorist activities, if he had 
knowledge that the group has been designated a FTO or has engaged or 
engages in terrorist activities.78 
The scope of liability under § 2339B is broad and extends to aiders and 
abettors and persons that conspire to violate the statute.79  Anyone that 
aids and abets the provision of material support or resources to a FTO, or 
conspires to do, may also be prosecuted under the statute.80  Finally, 
§ 2339B, but not § 2339A, has extraterritorial application.81  “Pursuant to 
§ 2339B(d)(2), federal courts may exercise jurisdiction for violations of the 
statute that occur outside of the United States.”82  Section 2339B(d)(1)(E) 
provides that there is jurisdiction over a violation of § 2339B if “the offense 
occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce,” regardless of where 
the provision of material support actually occurred.83  Therefore, someone 
who provides material support or resources to an FTO, and the prohibited 
                                                 
73 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). 
74 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a). 
75 Id. 
76 18 U.S.C § 2339B(a)(1). 
77 561 U.S. 1, 15–17 (2010). 
78 See id. at 36–37 (noting that money can be directed to funding violent activities, 
humanitarian aid, and training in dispute resolution). 
79 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d)(1)(F). 
80 Id. 
81 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d). 
82 See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d)(2) (“There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense 
under this section”). 
83 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d)(1)(E). 
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conduct occurs entirely outside the United States, may be prosecuted 
under § 2339B.84 
Participation in the sale of ISIS oil is clearly a violation of the material 
support statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.85  First, ISIS has been designated a 
“foreign terrorist organization” by the Secretary of State.86  Second, the 
transportation, distribution, and purchase of ISIS oil constitute the 
provision of “material support or resources” to a FTO.87  The shipment of 
ISIS oil constitutes “transportation” under the definition of “material 
support or resources.”88  The provision of any other form of assistance in 
the illicit distribution of oil for ISIS arguably involves a “service” provided 
to a FTO.89  Further, the payment for ISIS oil constitutes the provision of 
funding, which is prohibited under the statute.90  Further, the transfer of 
funds from one bank account to another for the payment of ISIS oil 
constitutes the provision of “financial services” under the statute.91  Thus, 
banks that knowingly transfer funds involving the sale of ISIS oil engage 
in prohibited conduct under the material support statute.  Finally, the fact 
that the transportation, distribution, and sale of oil occurred outside the 
United States is not a defense.  As previously noted, § 2339B expressly 
authorizes extraterritorial application of the statute, if the provision of 
material support or resources affects foreign commerce.92  Since the sale of 
oil affects foreign commerce, federal courts have jurisdiction over the 
offense. 
The critical issue is whether the persons involved in the distribution 
and sale of ISIS oil had knowledge that they were acting for or on behalf 
of a FTO or foreign organization that engages in terrorist activities.  In 
light of widely published media reports of ISIS members participating in 
the barbaric beheading of two American journalists, and committing other 
atrocities, this would be an easy element for prosecutors to prove.93  
                                                 
84 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d)(1). 
85 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a)(1). 
86 See also 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2012) (authorizing the Secretary of State to designate a foreign 
group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Terrorist 
Designations of Groups Operating in Syria (May 14, 2014), http://www.state.gov/r/ 
pa/prs/ps/2014/05/226067.htm [http://perma.cc/2BWU-84BR] (amending the 
designation of Al Qaida in Iraq to add the alias Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (“ISIL”) 
as its primary name). 
87 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d)(1)(E). 
93 Chelsea J. Carter & Ashley Fantz, ISIS Video Shows Beheading of American Journalist Steven 
Sotloff, CNN (Sep. 9, 2014, 6:32 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/02/world/meast/isis-
american-journalist-sotloff/ [http://perma.cc/3V8V-XBX6]. 
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Knowledge also can be proven by evidence that the defendant engaged in 
willful blindness and deliberately avoided learning the truth.  Finally, 
§ 2339B only requires proof of knowledge.94  Prosecutors are not required 
to prove that the individuals that facilitated the sale of oil for ISIS intended 
that the profits from the sale be used to commit a terrorist attack or fund 
other terrorist-related activities. 
While the material support statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, provides federal 
prosecutors an invaluable prosecutorial tool to prevent the financing of 
terrorism, prosecuting terrorist financiers and persons that provide 
financial assistance to terrorists has not been a priority for the DOJ.  Since 
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, there have been relatively few 
major terrorist financing prosecutions.  The most significant prosecution 
under the material support statute involves prosecuting members of the 
Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (“HLF”), a charity 
headquartered in Richardson, Texas.95  The Government alleged that HLF 
was the principal fundraiser for Hamas, raising over $12 million for the 
terrorist organization in the United States.96  In 2010, five members of HLF 
were convicted by a federal jury for providing and conspiracy to provide 
financial assistance to Hamas, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.97  
However, the initial charges in the HLF case were filed in 2004.98 
Since the prosecution of the members of the HLF, there have been few, 
if any, major terrorist financing prosecutions targeting the financial 
networks, deep-pocket donors, or front organizations responsible for 
raising large sums of money for al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups.  
Moreover, the DOJ has failed to bring criminal charges against anyone for 
raising funds for ISIS. 
It is difficult to explain or justify the low number of terrorist financing 
prosecutions by the DOJ.  Whatever the reason for the paucity of cases, 
Congress needs to ensure that prosecuting terrorist financing cases is a top 
priority, and that the DOJ is allocating sufficient prosecutorial resources 
for this purpose.  One way to ensure a greater emphasis on terrorist 
financing prosecutions is to require the DOJ to submit an annual report to 
Congress, which includes the number of terrorist financing cases 
investigated and prosecuted by the DOJ, including the status of any 
pending terrorist financing cases, and the number of criminal convictions 
for providing funds and financial assistance to foreign terrorist 
organizations. 
                                                 
94 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). 
95 United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 485 (5th Cir. 2011). 
96 Id. at 486–87. 
97 Id. at 538. 
98 United States v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 445 F.3d 771, 777 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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Disrupting the financing of ISIS is critical to preventing the expansion 
of ISIS in the Middle East, and the commission of terrorist attacks in the 
United States by lone-wolf terrorists trained or inspired by ISIS.  
Prosecuting individuals and entities under the material support statute, 
that are enabling ISIS to sell its oil abroad, could reduce an important 
stream of ISIS funding and prevent acts of terrorism. 
C. Prioritize the Imposition of Civil Monetary Penalties on Banks that Willfully 
Violate the Bank Secrecy Act and Create a Risk of Terrorist Financing 
The Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) imposes important legal duties on 
financial institutions to prevent money laundering and terrorist 
financing.99  The centerpiece of the federal regulatory scheme established 
by the BSA is the requirement that banks and other financial institutions 
establish, implement, and maintain written programs and procedures to 
prevent money laundering and terrorist financing.100  Every financial 
institution is required to establish an anti-money laundering or counter-
terrorist financing program that includes the following minimum 
requirements:  “(1) the development of internal policies, procedures, and 
internal controls; (2) the designation of a compliance officer; (3) an 
ongoing employee training program; and (4) an independent audit 
function to test programs.”101 
Suspicious activity reporting (“SAR”) forms the cornerstone of the 
BSA reporting system.102  Identifying and reporting suspicious 
transactions “is critical to the United States’ ability to utilize financial 
information to combat terrorism, terrorist financing, money laundering, 
and other financial crimes.”103  A transaction is suspicious if it: (i) 
“involves funds derived from illegal activities or 
is . . . conducted . . . to . . . disguise funds or assets derived from illegal 
activities”; (ii) “is designed to evade [the reporting or record-keeping] 
requirements of the [BSA]” (e.g., structuring transactions to avoid 
currency transaction reporting); or (iii) “has no business or apparent 
lawful purpose or is not the sort in which the particular customer would 
normally be expected to engage, and the bank knows of no reasonable 
                                                 
99 See Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, tits. I & II, 84 Stat. 1114, 1118 (1970). 
100 See 18 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1) (2012). 
101 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1); 31 C.F.R. § 1020.210 (2012). 
102 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2012). 
103 FED. FIN. INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANK SECRECY ACT/ANTI MONEY 
LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL 60 (2014), https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/ 
documents/BSA_AML_Man_2014_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/NC9H-8PHT] [hereinafter 
FFIEC Manual]. 
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explanation for the transaction after examining the available facts, 
including the background and possible purposes of the transaction.”104 
A suspicious transaction should be reported to the Treasury 
Department if it involves or aggregates at least $5000 in funds or other 
assets.105  Federal regulations requires that a SAR be electronically filed 
through the BSA E-Filing System no later than thirty calendar days from 
the date of the initial detection of facts that may constitute a basis for filing 
a SAR.106  However, if no suspect can be identified, the time period for 
filing a SAR is extended to sixty days.107 
For all accounts, banks should have systems in place to detect unusual 
or suspicious transactions.  “A transaction includes a deposit; a 
withdrawal; a transfer between accounts; and exchange of currency; an 
extension of credit; a purchase or sale of any stock, bond, certificate of 
deposit or other monetary instrument or investment security; or any 
payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a bank.”108 
The requirement to monitor suspicious transaction is ongoing, and, in 
certain circumstances, the bank should consider closing the customer 
account.  The bank “should continue to review the suspicious activity to 
determine whether other actions may be appropriate, such as bank 
management determining that it is necessary to terminate a relationship 
with the customer or employee that is the subject of the filing.”109 
The failure to comply with federal banking regulations intended to 
prevent banks from being used to facilitate the financing of terrorism 
could result in the imposition of large civil monetary penalties by the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), an agency within the 
Treasury Department responsible for enforcing the BSA.  In fact, FinCEN 
has imposed multi-million dollar civil penalties against numerous banks 
for non-compliance with the BSA for creating a money laundering risk, 
including, for example, ABN AMRO Bank ($30 million), Riggs Bank ($25 
million), and Israel Discount Bank of New York ($12 million).  However, 
these cases involved non-compliance with the anti-money laundering 
provisions of the BSA, and were not related to terrorist financing. 
There have been very few cases where the BSA violation involved 
concerns of terrorist financing.  The scarcity of terrorist financing cases 
raises serious questions about FinCEN’s enforcement of the BSA 
provisions intended to prevent the financing of terrorism.  It is unclear 
                                                 
104 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(2)(i)–(iii) (2012). 
105 Id. § 1020.320(2). 
106 Id. § 1020.320(b)(3). 
107 Id. 
108 FFIEC Manual, supra note 103, at 60–61. 
109 Id. at 69. 
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whether the lack of rigorous enforcement of the BSA counter-terrorist 
financing regulations is due to the lack of personnel and other resources, 
or lax oversight by the Federal regulators. 
In 2005, FinCEN imposed a $24 million civil penalty against the New 
York branch of Arab Bank, a foreign bank headquartered in Amman, 
Jordan.  Action taken by FinCEN was motivated by concerns that Arab 
Bank was being used by front entities to transfer money to Hamas.  More 
specifically, Arab Bank’s New York branch allegedly handled wire 
transfers of more than $20 million involving forty-five suspected Hamas 
terrorists and affiliated terrorist groups.110  However, the Bank failed to 
file suspicious transaction reports with FinCEN involving such 
transactions.  In February 2005, Arab Bank was ordered to cease its 
traditional banking activities in New York, including wire transfer service 
and opening accounts.  In August 2005, FinCEN announced the 
imposition of a $24 million fine for failure to implement an effective anti-
money laundering and counter-terrorist financing program.  According to 
FinCEN, Arab Bank’s failure to implement an adequate system of internal 
controls to comply with the BSA regulations “posed heightened risks of 
money laundering and terrorist financing.” 
While Arab Bank maintained correspondent accounts that operated in 
jurisdictions that posed a heightened risk of terrorism and terrorist 
financing, the Bank only monitored transactions of individuals and 
entities that it considered direct customers of the Bank.  It failed to monitor 
the financial transactions of originators and beneficiaries of international 
funds transfers that did not maintain accounts at Arab Bank.  The bank 
also failed to implement procedures for obtaining and utilizing publicly 
available information to monitor and identity suspicious transactions.  
According to FinCEN, names similar to those of originators and 
beneficiaries in funds transfers cleared by Arab Bank appeared in 
congressional testimony, indictments in the United States, and research 
and media reports linked to terrorist activities.111  FinCEN also found that 
Arab Bank failed to comply with directives given by financial regulatory 
officials in the Palestinian Territories intended to prevent terrorist 
financing.  Foreign financial regulators issued circulars containing the 
names of suspected terrorists and ordered institutions holding accounts 
in the names of those individuals to either freeze their accounts or place 
them on a terror watch list.  However, Arab Bank lacked internal 
                                                 
110 Glenn R. Simpson, Arab Bank’s Link to Terrorism Poses Dilemma for U.S. Policy, WALL ST. 
J. (Apr. 20, 2005, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB111396116907311600 
[http://perma.cc/AXH9-AL4X]. 
111 Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 264 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Linde v. Arab Bank, 
PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 575–77, 589 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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procedures for cross-checking the names of these suspected terrorists 
against wire funds cleared by the bank.  Thus, the accounts of these 
suspected terrorists were not frozen as requested. 
Banks that knowingly transfer funds to suspected terrorists and fail to 
report such suspicious transactions to FinCEN violate the requirements of 
the BSA.  Under the BSA, FinCEN may impose substantial civil penalties 
against the offending banks for such violations.  FinCEN enforcement 
actions are therefore an important tool to hold financial institutions 
accountable for failing to prevent the transfer of funds to terrorists.  
However, if the BSA authority to punish banks that do business with 
foreign terrorists is rarely used, it cannot serve as an effective deterrent to 
ensure that banks are not being used to transfer money to terrorists to 
finance acts of terrorism. 
D. Amend the Civil Provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act to Afford Victims of 
International Terrorism a Meaningful Remedy 
The Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), provides “a 
private right of action for civil damages for any national of the United 
States injured by ‘reason of an act’ of ‘international terrorism’ (or the 
victim’s estate) to sue those responsible for the act in a U.S. court for treble 
damages, no matter where in the world the act occurred.”112  While the 
civil tort statute is outside the jurisdiction of the Treasury Department, it 
is an important statutory tool to enable the victims of terrorist attacks to 
hold banks and bank officials liable for knowingly transferring funds and 
providing financial services to terrorists.  However, the statute needs to 
be amended by Congress to provide an effective remedy for the victims of 
terrorism. 
The purpose of the civil tort provision of the ATA is to deter acts of 
international terrorism by punishing terrorists and their financial 
supporters “where it hurts them most: at their lifeline, their funds.”113  
However, these private tort actions have been largely ineffective.  The 
threat of a large civil monetary judgment has no deterrent effect on foreign 
terrorists or foreign terrorist organizations that “are unlikely to have 
                                                 
112 18 U.S.C. § 2333 et seq., is the civil remedies provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act, added 
Oct. 29, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, Title X, § 1003(a)(4), 106 Stat. 4506, codified as amended.  
For information on the legislative history of the ATA, see Almog v. Arab Bank PLC, 471 F. 
Supp. 2d 257, 265–66 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).  For the interpretation of § 2333(a) as referenced above, 
see United States v. Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 955 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(en banc) (Wood, J., dissenting), overruled en banc by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 
F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012). 
113 See Estate of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 304 F. Supp. 2d 232, 238 (D.R.I. 2004) 
(reiterating Senator Grassley’s comment during the floor debates of 18 U.S.C. § 2333). 
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assets, much less assets in the United States.”114  As a result, ATA lawsuits 
have been filed almost exclusively against secondary actors, such as 
charitable organizations and domestic and foreign corporations.  
However, the ATA has been primarily used against financial institutions.  
These private tort actions allege that banks have committed acts of 
“international terrorism” by providing financial services to terrorist 
organizations that resulted in plaintiffs’ injuries.115  These claims have 
been largely unsuccessful.  To date, only one bank has been held liable 
under the ATA.116 
To sustain a claim under § 2333(a), plaintiffs must prove that they 
were injured “by reason of an act of international terrorism.”117  The term 
“international terrorism” includes “violent acts” or “acts dangerous to 
human life” that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States.118  
Violations of the federal material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 
                                                 
114 Boim v. Holy Land Found., 291 F.3d 1000, 1021 (7th Cir. 2007). 
115 See, e.g., Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, 768 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 2014); In re Terrorist 
Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 118, 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2013); Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 
82, 86, 94 (2d Cir. 2013); Suppl. Mem. of Law of HSBC Holdings PLC, at 6, Freeman v. HSBC 
Holdings PLC, No. 14-CV-06601 (E.D.N.Y 2015); Wultz v. Bank of China, 32 F. Supp. 3d 486, 
488–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 944 F. Supp. 2d 215, 216–17 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); 
Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 925 F. Supp. 2d 414, 426 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Gill v. Arab Bank, 
PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 542, 561, 566–67 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 
410, 427 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Almog v. Arab Bank, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 292 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Stutts 
v. De Dietrich Group, 465 F. Supp. 2d 156, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
116 See Linde v. Arab Bank, 269 F.R.D 186, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Stephanie Clifford, 
Arab Bank Liable for Supporting Terrorist Efforts, Jury Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/23/nyregion/arab-bank-found-guilty-of-supporting-
terrorist.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/UXB4-83SN] (discussing the Arab Bank case and the 
case holding). 
117 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012).  Section 2331(1) defines “international terrorism” as activities 
that: 
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that 
would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the 
United States or of any State; 
(B) appear to be intended— 
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or 
coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping; and  
(C) occur primarily outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which 
they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate 
or coerce, or the locale in which the perpetrators operate or seek 
asylum[.] 
Id. § 2331(1)(A)–(C) (2012). 
118 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A). 
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2339B, and terrorist financing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339C, have been held 
to involve “acts dangerous to human life” and, therefore, constitute acts 
of “international terrorism” for purposes of § 2333(a).119  Section 2339A 
makes it a crime to provide “material support or resources . . . knowing or 
intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out” a 
violation of one or more of the violent crimes enumerated in the statute.120  
Section 2339B prohibits “knowingly” providing material support or 
resources to a “foreign terrorist organization.”121  Finally, § 2339C 
punishes providing or collecting funds “with the intention that such funds 
be used, or with the knowledge that such funds are to be used . . . to carry 
out” one of the crimes enumerated in the terrorist financing statute.122 
A bank that provides financial services to a foreign terrorist 
organization, such as ISIS, that kills Americans abroad may violate 
§ 2333(a).123  A violation is based on a chain of statutory incorporations by 
reference.124  The first link in the statutory chain is § 2333(a), which 
provides a civil cause of action for injuries suffered by reason of an act of 
“international terrorism.”125  The second statutory link is § 2331, which 
defines “international terrorism” to include activities that involve “acts 
dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the 
United States,” and “appear to be intended . . . to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population” or “affect the conduct of a government 
by . . . assassination,” and “transcend national boundaries in terms of the 
means by which they are accomplished” or “the persons they appear 
intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which the perpetrators 
                                                 
119 See Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 68–69 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The 
Seventh Circuit, and several district courts in this Circuit, have concluded that a defendant’s 
violation of the criminal material-support statutes . . . constitutes an act of ‘international 
terrorism’ within the meaning of section 2331(1) . . . .”); Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy 
Land Found., 291 F.3d 1000, 1016 (7th Cir. 2002) (“We are using sections 2339A and 2339B 
not as independent sources of liability under section 2333, but to amplify what Congress 
meant by ‘international terrorism.’”); Goldberg, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 427; Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d 
at 268 (“violations of sections 2339A, 2339B(a)(1), and 2339C can serve as predicate crimes 
giving rise to liability under the ATA”); Weiss, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 613; Strauss v. Credit 
Lyonnais, S.A., No. 06-CV-0702 (CPS), 2006 WL 2862704, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that 
“[v]iolations of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B and § 2339C are recognized as international terrorism 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a)”); Linde v. Arab Bank, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
120 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2012). 
121 Id. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012). 
122 Id. § 2339C(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012). 
123 Id. § 2333(a) (2012); id. § 2339B. 
124 See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 690, 721 (7th Cir. 2008); 
see also Goldberg, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 426 (noting the chain of references for violations of statutes 
in international terrorism). 
125 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a); see also Boim, 549 F.3d at 690. 
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operate or seek asylum.”126  The next link involves the material support 
statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B, and terrorist financing statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 2339C.127 Arguably, the provision of financial services to a foreign 
terrorist organization constitutes an “act dangerous to human life,” and 
qualifies as an act of “international terrorism” under § 2333(a).128  The final 
statutory link involves 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a), which punishes whoever kills 
a United States national outside of the United States.129  Ultimately, the 
courts have held that “[b]y this chain of statutory incorporations by 
reference to § 2333(a) to § 2331(1) to § 2339A, [§ 2339B or § 2339C], to 
§ 2332” a bank’s provision of financial services or funds to a terrorist 
organization that targets Americans outside the United States may 
support a claim under § 2333(a).130 
There are two principal reasons why the ATA has proven ineffective 
against banks.  First, providing financial services to persons that commit 
acts of international terrorism involves secondary conduct.  The terrorists 
that actually committed the terrorist attack are primarily liable for killing 
or injuring United States nationals.  At most, the bank aided and abetted 
the terrorists by transferring funds and providing other financial services 
to such persons.  However, the ATA is silent on whether civil liability 
extends to aiders and abettors of acts of international terrorism.  
Moreover, the courts are deeply divided on the issue.  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second and Seventh Circuits hold that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2333(a) does not authorize a cause of action against aiders and 
abettors.131  In contrast, the United States District Courts for the Southern 
District of Texas, District of Columbia, and Southern District of Florida 
have reached the opposite conclusion, finding that the ATA extends to 
secondary actors.132 
                                                 
126 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A)–(C) (2012). 
127 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B, 2339C (2012). 
128 See Boim, 549 F.3d at 690; Goldberg, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 427. 
129 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a)(1)–(3) (2012). 
130 Boim, 549 F.3d at 690. 
131 See Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 98 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We doubt that Congress, 
having included in the ATA several express provisions with respect to aiding and abetting 
in connection with the criminal provisions, can have intended § 2333 to authorize civil 
liability for aiding and through its silence.”); Boim, 549 F.3d at 689 (“[S]tatutory silence on 
the subject of secondary liability means there is none . . . .”). 
132 See, e.g., Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 56 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding 
that “civil liability under the ATA extends to aiders and abettors who provide money to 
terrorists”); In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute and S’holder Derivative Litig., 
690 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1309 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (holding that plaintiffs stated a claim for primary 
liability, secondary liability, and conspiracy liability under the ATA); Abecassis v. Wyatt, 785 
F. Supp. 2d 614, 649 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (alleging that plaintiffs sufficiently stated claims under 
ATA based on aiding and abetting liability and primary liability). 
Gurulé: The Need to Refocus the U.S. Government's Post-9/11 Counter-Terro
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016
516 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
In a jurisdiction that does not recognize aiding and abetting liability 
under the ATA, plaintiffs face a difficult burden of proof.  Plaintiffs must 
prove that the provision of financial services to terrorists was the 
proximate cause of the injuries suffered by plaintiffs.  More specifically, 
plaintiffs must prove that the provision of financial services was a 
“substantial factor” in the subsequent terrorist attack.133  The injury from 
a terrorist attack must also have been “reasonably foreseeable” as a 
natural consequence of the bank’s conduct.134  Except in the most extreme 
cases, a person would not reasonably expect or foresee that the provision 
of routine banking services would result in a terrorist bombing killing 
innocent civilians. 
If, on the other hand, the ATA civil claims are filed in a jurisdiction 
that authorizes liability for aiders and abettors, plaintiffs only have to 
prove that the terrorists (principals) committed an act of international 
terrorism that caused plaintiffs’ injuries, and the bank’s provision of 
financial services “substantially assisted” the criminal violation.135  There 
is no requirement that it was reasonably foreseeable that the provision of 
routine banking services would result in a terrorist attack.  Plaintiffs 
therefore have an easier burden of proof in a jurisdiction that recognizes 
aiding and abetting liability under the ATA. 
The second reason why plaintiffs have been largely unsuccessful in 
holding banks liable under the ATA involves the meaning of the term 
“international terrorism.”  Under the ATA statute, “international 
terrorism” requires proof that the prohibited conduct “appear to be 
intended . . . (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii)  to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) 
to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, 
or kidnapping.”136  Plaintiffs face a difficult legal hurdle to prove that the 
                                                 
133 See Goldberg, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 429 (“proximate causation requires that plaintiffs show 
defendant’s actions were ‘a substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation,’ and 
that the injury was ‘reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence’”); 
Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 91 (discussing that the defendant’s action must be a “substantial factor 
in the sequence of responsible causation”); see also Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, 925 F. Supp. 
2d 414, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[A] reasonable juror could conclude that the sizable amount of 
money sent from Defendant to Hamas front organizations was a substantial reason that 
Hamas was able to perpetrate the terrorist attacks at issue, and that Hamas’ increased ability 
to carry out deadly attacks was a foreseeable consequence of sending millions of dollars to 
groups controlled by Hamas.”). 
134 See also Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 542, 572 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Assuming 
plaintiff could demonstrate that the Bank acted recklessly, it has not shown that his—an 
American’s—injuries were reasonably foreseeable by the Bank as a result of the size and 
timing of funds transfers put in issue by plaintiff.”). 
135 See Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (discussing that the plaintiff must show that the aiders 
and abettors had “substantially assisted” the criminal violation). 
136 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A)–(B) (2012). 
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provision of basic banking services “appear[s] to be intended” for a 
terrorism-related purpose.  The bank’s transfer of funds was more likely 
committed for a financial purpose, such as making money from the 
international funds transfers, and totally unrelated to any of the terrorism 
purposes set forth in the statute.  The different application of the statute 
could result in inconsistent verdicts and encourage forum shopping.  
Whether plaintiffs are successful in litigating an ATA claim should not 
turn on the jurisdiction where the lawsuit is filed. 
The aiding and abetting problem can be easily solved by legislative 
amendment.  If Congress intended to prohibit banks from knowingly 
providing financial services to terrorists, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) should be 
amended to expressly authorize aiding and abetting liability.  Prohibiting 
aiding and abetting under the statute would also solve the “appear to be 
intended” issue.  While plaintiffs would have to prove that the acts of the 
principals “appear to be intended” for a terrorism-related purpose, such 
requirement would not apply to aiders and abettors.  Plaintiffs would 
have to prove that the secondary actor had knowledge that the funds were 
being transferred to foreign terrorists and such services “substantially 
assisted” the principals in committing the acts of terrorism. 
The civil provision of the ATA is applicable against ISIS, ISIS-
controlled entities, and banks that knowingly transfer funds and provide 
financial services to ISIS.  For example, under a theory of aiding and 
abetting a violation of § 2333(a), the surviving family members of slain 
American journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff could bring suit 
under the ATA against the individuals and entities that facilitated the sale 
of ISIS oil, as well as banks that knowingly received and transferred funds 
for ISIS.  Arguably, these individuals and entities provided substantial 
assistance to ISIS, enabling the terrorist organization to finance its terrorist 
activities, and thereby aided and abetted acts of international terrorism.  
However, the statute needs to be amended to expressly permit liability 
under a theory of aiding and abetting. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
ISIS is a violent and ruthless terrorist organization that poses an 
imminent threat to regional stability in the Middle East, and further seeks 
to inspire lone wolf attacks around the globe, including the United States.  
Moreover, the terror group is flush with funds to finance its goal of 
establishing a caliphate state in the Middle East.  To effectively disrupt the 
flow of funds to ISIS, the Treasury Department needs to refocus and 
intensify its efforts under E.O. 13224, targeting individuals and entities 
involved in the principal sources of ISIS funding, such as the illicit oil 
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trade, trafficking in stolen artifacts from Iraq and Syria, and kidnap 
ransom payments. 
The Treasury Department should work more closely with the DOJ in 
sharing financial intelligence information to increase the number of 
successful terrorist financing prosecutions under the material support 
statutes.  Moreover, the Treasury should make more effective use of its 
civil regulatory authorities under the BSA to ensure that banks are not 
being used for terrorist financing purposes.  Finally, Congress should 
amend the civil provision of the ATA to provide the victims of 
international terrorism an effective remedy to hold banks accountable that 
knowingly transfer funds to ISIS and other international terrorist 
organizations.  Collectively, these proposals will enhance the effectiveness 
of the United States Government’s efforts to disrupt and reduce the flow 
of funds to ISIS, prevent future acts of terrorism, and save innocent lives. 
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